This paper investigates the capacity region of a discrete memoryless (DM) multiple access wiretap (MAC-WT) channel where, besides confidential messages, the users have also open messages to transmit. All these messages are intended for the legitimate receiver but only the confidential messages need to be protected from the eavesdropper. By using random coding, we find an achievable secrecy rate region, within which perfect secrecy can be realized, i.e., all users can communicate with the legitimate receiver with arbitrarily small probability of error, while the confidential information leaked to the eavesdropper tends to zero.
I. INTRODUCTION
Different from the key-based cryptographic techniques, information theoretic secrecy exploits the random propagation properties of radio channels to prevent eavesdroppers from extracting confidential information of authorized users, and has triggered considerable research interest recently [1] . The study of information theoretic secrecy in communications starts from several seminal papers [2] - [4] . In [2] , Wyner considered a discrete memoryless (DM) channel with an eavesdropper which observes a stochastically degraded version of the output of the main channel, and aimed to maximize the transmission rate to the legitimate receiver while keeping the eavesdropper as ignorant of the secret message as possible. The trade-off between transmission rate and the equivocation of the eavesdropper was investigated, and the existence of a secrecy capacity was proven in [2] . Based on [2] , in [3] the achievable rate-equivocation region of a degraded Gaussian wiretap channel was investigated. In [4] , Wyner's work was extended to a non-degraded broadcast wiretap channel, and to a scenario including a confidential message for the legitimate receiver only and a common message intended for both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper.
Following the work in [2] - [4] , the information theoretic secrecy problems for several other channel models have been studied, including the multiple access wiretap (MAC-WT) channel [5] - [8] . Both [5] and [6] considered a MAC-WT channel with a weaker eavesdropper which sees a degraded version of the main channel. Reference [5] developed an outer bound for the secrecy capacity region of the DM MAC-WT channel. In [6] , two separate secrecy measures were first defined for a Gaussian MAC-WT channel, and achievable rate regions were provided for different secrecy constraints by using Gaussian inputs and stochastic encoders. In [7] and [8] , non-degraded MAC-WT channels were considered. Specifically, in [7] , the authors extended the work of [5] to a general Gaussian MAC-WT channel, and besides secret message, each user also had an open message to transmit. An achievable rate region for both secret and open rates was then provided. In [8] , the MAC-WT channel with a DM main channel and different wiretapping scenarios were considered.
In this paper, we study the information theoretic secrecy problem for a general MAC-WT channel. Different from [7] , which assumes Gaussian inputs and Gaussian channels, we consider DM channels. Each user is assumed to have a secret message and an open message to transmit. This constitutes a generalization of the results in [8] , where each user only transmits a secret message. By using random coding, we find an achievable secrecy rate region, where users can communicate with legitimate receiver with the arbitrarily small probability of error, while the confidential information leaked to the eavesdropper tends to zero.
Furthermore, we also show that the analogous achievable region given in [7] 1 does not hold in general. In this sense, our result amends [7, Theorem 1] which appears to be not correct in general.
II. CHANNEL MODEL
Consider a MAC wiretap communication system with two users, a legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper as shown in Fig. 1 . Let K = {1, 2} denote the set of users. Each user k ∈ K needs to send a secret message M k and an open message W k to the legitimate receiver. We assume a DM wiretap channel (X 1 , X 2 , p(y, z|x 1 , x 2 ), Y, Z) where x 1 ∈ X 1 and x 2 ∈ X 2 are respectively channel inputs from user 1 and user 2, and y ∈ Y and z ∈ Z are respectively channel outputs at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. 
The secrecy level of the MAC system is evaluated by the information leakage rate, which is defined as
where M S = {M k , ∀k ∈ S}. For perfect secrecy of all transmitted secret messages, we would like R E,S → 0, ∀S ⊆ K. Note that since messages M 1 and M 2 are independent, we have
which indicates that if the leakage rate for all confidential messages vanishes, then the system is secure also for all possible message subsets. The average probability of error is defined as
is said to be achievable if for any δ > 0 there exists a sequence of 2 nR s 1 , 2 nR o 1 , 2 nR s 2 , 2 nR o 2 , n codes for increasing n such that
III. MAIN RESULTS
We use the short-hand notation p(x 1 ) and p(x 2 ) to indicate P X1 (x) with x ∈ X 1 and P X2 (x) with x ∈ X 2 , respectively. Analogous short-hand notations are clear from the context. In this section, we state our main results. Theorem 1. Let (X 1 , X 2 , Y, Z) ∼ p(x 1 )p(x 2 )p(y, z|x 1 , x 2 ). Then, any rate tuple (R s
is achievable, where X S = {X k : k ∈ S},S is the complement set of S, i.e.,S = K \ S,k = 1 if k = 2, andk = 2 if k = 1. Let R(X 1 , X 2 ) denote the set of rate tuples satisfying (6) . Then, the convex hull of the union of R(X 1 , X 2 ) over all p(x 1 )p(x 2 ) is an achievable secrecy rate region of the considered MAC wiretap channel.
Proof: See Section IV. The result in Theorem 1 can be directly extended to the more general case with K ≥ 1 users.
is achievable. Let R(X K ) denote the set of rate tuples satisfying (7) . Then, the convex hull of the union of R(X K ) over all K k=1 p(x k ) is an achievable secrecy rate region of the MAC wiretap channel with K users.
Proof: This lemma can be proven by a simple extension of the proof of Theorem 1.
Remark 1. In reference [7] , the same setting of our paper is considered for the Gaussian MAC wiretap channel. A superposition encoding rate region, in which the rate 4-tuples
is given in [7, eq. (19) ]. Then, it is stated in [7, Theorem 1] that the convex hull of the superposition encoding rate region union over all power constraint is achievable. By comparing (6) and (8), we notice that they differ in the third inequality of (6). In Appendix A, we show that the result in [7, Theorem 1] unfortunately is not correct. In this sense, our result provides a general achievable rate region for the MAC-WT scenario with confidential and open messages while [7, Theorem 1] does not.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1 Let (X 1 , X 2 ) ∼ p(x 1 )p(x 2 ), and assume that I(X S ; Y |XS ) > I(X S ; Z), ∀ S ⊆ K. In the following, we show that there exists a 2 nR s 1 , 2 nR o 1 , 2 nR s 2 , 2 nR o 2 , n code such that any rate tuple inside region R(X 1 , X 2 ), i.e., any (R s
is achievable, where is an arbitrarily small positive number. This, together with the standard time-sharing over coding strategies, suffices to prove the theorem. We start with the following lemma.
Proof: By eliminating R g 1 and R g 2 in (10) using the Fourier-Motzkin procedure [9, Appendix D], it can be shown that (9) is the projection of (10) onto the hyperplane {R g 1 = 0, R g 2 = 0}. Lemma 2 can thus be proven. Due to space limitation, the detailed procedure is omitted.
A. Coding Scheme
For a given rate tuple
Then, a coding scheme is provided below. Codebook generation. For each message pair (m k , w k ) ∈ M k × W k of user k, generate a subcodebook C k (m k ) by randomly and independently generating 2 n(R o
where l k ∈ L k,m k . These subcodebooks constitute the codebook of user k, i.e.,
The codebooks of all users, i.e., C k , ∀k ∈ K, are then revealed to all transmitters and receivers, including the eavesdropper.
Encoding
Decoding. The decoder at the legitimate receiver declares that (m 1 ,ŵ 1 ,m 2 ,ŵ 2 ) is sent if it is the unique message tuple such that (x n 1 (l 1 ), x n 2 (l 2 ), y n ) ∈ T (n) (X 1 , X 2 , Y ), for some l 1 and l 2 such that x n k (l k ) ∈ C k (m k ,ŵ k ), for k = 1, 2. B. Analysis of the probability of error
can be proven by using LLN and the packing lemma that the probability of error averaged over the random codebook and encoding tends to zero as n → ∞. The proof follows exactly the same steps used in [9, Subsection 4.5.1]. Hence, lim n→∞ P e ≤ δ.
C. Analysis of the information leakage rate For a given codebook C k , the secret message M k is a function of the codeword index L k . Hence,
In order to measure the information leakage rate (12), we first transform H(L 1 , L 2 |Z n ) as follows
where (a) holds since X n 1 and X n 2 are respectively functions of indexes L 1 and
Then, we provide an upper bound on term H(L 1 , L 2 |M 1 , M 2 , Z n ) in the following theorem.
Proof: See Appendix B. Substituting (13) and (14) into (12), we have
Theorem 1 is thus proven.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied the capacity region of a discrete memoryless (DM) multiple access wiretap (MAC-WT) channel where, besides confidential messages, the users have also open messages to transmit. Different from [7] , which assumed Gaussian inputs and Gaussian channels, we considered general inputs and DM channels. By using random coding, we found an achievable rate region where the information leakage of the confidential messages to the eavesdropper and the probability of error of all messages at the intended receiver vanish as the block length increase to infinity. Furthermore, we also correct the result in [7] that studied the same scenario in the Gaussian MAC case, but where the provided achievable region is actually not generally achievable.
APPENDIX A
For brevity, we also consider the two-user case for reference [7] . When proving [7, Theorem 1], it is stated in [7] 
Note that for comparison, we replace log expressions for the Gaussian case with Gaussian inputs in [7] with mutual informations. Moreover, although not mentioned, it is clear by the definition of R
In order to check whether it is true that for any rate tuple Theorem 1] is true, with rate splitting, all rate tuples in region R 1 should be able to be transformed to rate tuples in region R 2 . However, in the following we show that R 2 is equivalent to R, and there exist rate tuples in region R 1 which can not be transformed to rate tuples in region R 2 .
For any given rate tuple
Hence, A is also in region R.
Based on the values of R o 1 and R o 2 , all rate tuples in region R can be divided into 6 categories as shown in Fig. 2 . In the following we show that, with rate splitting, any given rate
in region R can be transformed to another rate tuple B in region R 2 .
If rate tuple B belongs to category 1, i.e.,
it is obvious that B is also in region R 2 . If rate tuple B belongs to category 2, i.e.,
We get a new rate tuple
. Since B is in region R, it satisfies (6) . Hence,
The values of R s 2 + R o 2 and R s 2 remain unchanged. Hence, B is in region R 2 .
If B belongs to category 3, i.e.,
A new rate tuple B = (R s 1 ,R o 1 , R s 2 , R o 2 ) is then obtained. Sincẽ
and the values of
Analogously, if B belongs to category 4, i.e.,
and if B belongs to category 5, i.e.,
It can be similarly proven that the newly obtained rate tuple
is thus in region R 2 . Until now, we have shown that any rate tuple A in region R 2 is also in region R, and by using rate splitting, any rate tuple B in region R can be transformed to another rate tuple B in region R 2 . Therefore, with rate splitting R 2 is equivalent to R.
Next, we show that there exist rate tuples in region R 1 which can not be transformed to rate tuples in region R 2 .
Since (X 1 , X 2 , Y, Z) ∼ p(x 1 )p(x 2 )p(y, z|x 1 , x 2 ), it is possible that
When the above inequality holds, it can be easily found that rate tuple C satisfies (8) 
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 2
For given n-th order product distribution on X n 1 ×X n 2 ×Z n , recall the definition of conditional -typical sets
To prove Theorem 2, we bound H(L 1 , L 2 |m 1 , m 2 , Z n ) for every secret message pair (m 1 , m 2 ). First, for a given received signal z n at the eavesdropper, assume that it is a typical sequence, i.e., z n ∈ T (n) (Z), and define
and
In the following theorem, we give an upper bound on the expectation and the variance of N (m 1 , m 2 , z n ).
Theorem 3. The expectation and variance of N (m 1 , m 2 , z n ) can be bounded as
where δ 1 ( ) is given in (59), and
Proof: See Appendix C. Next, define the event E(m 1 , m 2 , z n ) = N (m 1 , m 2 , z n ) ≥ 2 n(∆+δ1( ))+1 . (46)
We have
where step (a) follows by applying the Chebyshev inequality, and (b) follows by (44). Due to (10), ∆ ≥ 0 and ∆ k ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K. Then, it is obvious that P {E(m 1 , m 2 , z n )} → 0 as n → ∞. For any z n ∈ T (n) (Z), define indicator variable
Then, P {E(m 1 , m 2 , z n ) = 1} → 0 as n → ∞.
Since there are 2 n(R o k +R g k ) codewords in each subcodebook C k (m k ), ∀k ∈ K, we have H(L 1 , L 2 |m 1 , m 2 , z n )
and H(L 1 , L 2 |m 1 , m 2 , Z n ) = z n ∈Z n p(z n )H(L 1 , L 2 |m 1 , m 2 , z n )
Moreover, based on the definition of N (m 1 , m 2 , z n ) in (42), we have H(L 1 , L 2 |m 1 , m 2 , E(m 1 , m 2 , z n ) = 0, z n )
≤ log(N (m 1 , m 2 , z n )) ≤n(∆ + δ 1 ( )) + 1, ∀ z n ∈ T (n) (Z),
where the last step holds due to the fact that when E(m 1 , m 2 , z n ) = 0, N (m 1 , m 2 , z n ) ≤ 2 n(∆+δ1( ))+1 . Based on (49), (50) and (51), H(L 1 , L 2 |m 1 , m 2 , Z n ) can be upperbounded as follows H(L 1 , L 2 |m 1 , m 2 , Z n ) =P Z n ∈ T (n) (Z) H(L 1 , L 2 |m 1 , m 2 , Z n , Z n ∈ T (n) (Z)) +P Z n / ∈ T (n) (Z) H(L 1 , L 2 |m 1 , m 2 , Z n , Z n / ∈ T (n) (Z)) ≤ z n ∈T (n) (Z) p(z n )H(L 1 , L 2 |m 1 , m 2 , z n ) + nα 1 = z n ∈T (n) (Z) {p 1 (z n )H(L 1 , L 2 |m 1 , m 2 , E(m 1 , m 2 , z n ) = 1, z n ) + p 2 (z n )H(L 1 , L 2 |m 1 , m 2 , E(m 1 , m 2 , z n ) = 0, z n )} + nα 1 ≤ z n ∈T (n) (Z) p(z n )α 2 H(L 1 , L 2 |m 1 , m 2 , z n ) +p(z n )H(L 1 , L 2 |m 1 , m 2 , E(m 1 , m 2 , z n ) = 0, z n ) + nα 1 ≤n(∆ + δ 2 ( )),
where α 1 = P Z n / ∈ T (n) (Z) (R o 1 + R g 1 + R o 2 + R g 2 ), p 1 (z n ) = p(z n )P {E(m 1 , m 2 , z n ) = 1} , ∀ z n ∈ T (n) (Z) p 2 (z n ) = p(z n )P {E(m 1 , m 2 , z n ) = 0} , ∀ z n ∈ T (n) (Z) α 2 = max P {E(m 1 , m 2 , z n ) = 1} , ∀ z n ∈ T (n) (Z) ,
E [N (m 1 , m 2 , z n )] 2 = (l1,l2)∈L1,m 1 ×L2,m 2 P (x n 1 (l 1 ), x n 2 (l 2 )) ∈ T (n) (X 1 , X 2 |z n ) + l 2 ∈L2,m 2 \{l2} P (x n 1 (l 1 ), x n 2 (l 2 )) ∈ T (n) (X 1 , X 2 |z n ), x n 2 (l 2 ) ∈ T (n) (X 2 |x n 1 (l 1 ), z n ) + l 1 ∈L1,m 1 \{l1} P (x n 1 (l 1 ), x n 2 (l 2 )) ∈ T (n) (X 1 , X 2 |z n ), x n 1 (l 1 ) ∈ T (n) (X 1 |x n 2 (l 2 ), z n ) +
